NATO CONFERENCE

NORFOLK, VIRGINIA

WEDNESDAY, 18TH APRIL 2007

REFLECTIONS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Summary – about relationships across the Atlantic from 1940 – the present.

The essential architecture of the Trans – Atlantic relationship was constructed upon the relationship established between Churchill and Roosevelt. This was carried forward by Attlee and Truman whose relationship was equally important, but made easier by the pioneering work done by their predecessors. The fact is that nations conduct their international policies to promote and protect their own interests. But the stark lesson of history is that competition between nations, along the nineteenth century model, only produces war and economic dislocation.

Relationships and Alliances

When we consider the nature of the Trans – Atlantic relationship, we should remind ourselves that history is full of alliances which meet a particular need at a particular time, and are often dissolved as soon as the need is gone. Britain’s history is rich in such alliances.

Britain has, in its history, fought against the Spanish and with the Spanish; against the Dutch and with the Dutch, against the Germans and alongside the Germans – our kings came from Hanover,

and Wellington fought alongside the Prussians against Napoleon.

Perhaps this underscores how history makes for strange bedfellows, unlikely people who are thrown into situations not of their choosing, but as circumstances dictate. Alliances, however, only mature into an enduring relationship through a much wider and deeper process than mere geopolitical calculations. `

In so far as the forging of the original Alliance in the early days of the Second World War, I hope I may be allowed a measure of personal pride when I reflect on the qualities of statesmanship which my Grandfather brought to his side of the creation of this profoundly important relationship.

WSC and FDR

Winston Churchill possessed many attributes which made him the right person to reach across the Atlantic in 1940 to Franklin Delano Roosevelt. He was a great student of history and his intuitive grasp of the importance of this relationship, at this moment in our two countries histories, was informed by his study of great events and of the men who shaped them. He once said “the further back in history you go, the better will be your understanding of the present”.

He was of course a politician to his fingertips and, having travelled widely and extensively in the United States, having first visited America in 1895, he well understood the forces that would be acting on Roosevelt’s side of the relationship. He also had the great benefit of an American mother, the remarkable but racy and very beautiful Miss Jenny Jerome of Brooklyn, New York, through whom incidentally he had not only American but revolutionary blood in his veins, which thus further helped him to understand the perspective from the other side of the fence.

However, the circumstances surrounding the forging of this relationship were not propitious. America felt that it had done its part to restore order in the Old World, by sending men to fight and die in the First World War. President Wilson’s attempts to shape the subsequent peace treaty to his way of thinking was defeated – as the Americans saw it – by the old colonial powers fighting over the spoils of Germany’s colonies, and after the failure of the Wilsonian attempt to influence the outcome of the Versailles Peace Treaty, America felt that it should not entangle itself in any more foreign wars.

All of this Churchill knew and understood. He had been in and out of government during and after the First World War, and saw the peacemaking from his own viewpoint. He had also travelled widely in America whilst out of office. Roosevelt, for his part, also understood the significance of the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939. He had been Secretary of the Navy in Wilson’s administration. He knew that matters in Europe would not be settled without some measure of involvement by the United States. But he also new that there was considerable opposition to America committing forces.

Roosevelt knew he could not win a third term by advocating American involvement in a European war; instead he sought out every avenue short of warlike activity to render assistance. Not because he felt it was right to keep the British Empire in business, but because he knew that as a Democrat, he favored democracy to tyranny. And he knew that, in their hearts, the American people did too.

The secret correspondence between Churchill and Roosevelt began as soon as my Grandfather was recalled to government, as First Lord of the Admiralty, in the autumn of 1939. This correspondence between two “Former Naval Persons”, as they called themselves in the codes, enabled them to develop the sort of back – channel which so often helps to shape great events.

Subsequent events speak for themselves; a resumption of war loans (which by the way the British Government has recently completed re – paying!), and the lend – lease arrangements, which equipped Britain’s armed forces to carry on the fight. “Give us the tools and we will finish the job!” as Churchill said. Nor was Roosevelt lacking in rhetorical ability: he spoke of the United States as “the arsenal of democracy”. Indeed every sort of assistance short of war was extended to Britain.

The attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941 changed everything. It brought America into the war against the Axis powers, but it also posed a problem for Churchill. The very reason why he hoped that America would enter the war; her superiority in men and material, became the thing which changed the nature of the relationship. Instead of being a clandestine partner, America suddenly became the overwhelming majority shareholder in the partnership.

This might have soured the fledgling Alliance, but for the efforts made by both Statesmen, to ensure that it did not. Churchill was not in a position to dictate how the various campaigns should be prosecuted, and he had to use his powers of persuasion. He also needed to husband the personal and political capital that he had built up with Roosevelt, to ensure that – for example, the first priority would be the liberation of Europe.

A study of the 1940s shows us that no alliance and no institution, however noble its origins, can prosper without overcoming the tendencies of human nature and national pride. A proud imperial and colonial power, Great Britain, had to come to terms with its new status as a lesser power. Churchill knew this. The isolationist Republic had to step up to its responsibilities and assume a world leadership role. Roosevelt knew this. The foundation of the landscape of the post 1945 world was shaped largely by the relationship of these two Statesmen who truly understood each other, and knew what they could ask of each other, and of what they could ask their own peoples.

Attlee – Truman

The death of Roosevelt at the very point of victory, and the political defeat of Churchill at the hands of the British electorate did not of course end the Trans – Atlantic relationship. The job was not yet complete and fresh events posed new challenges. America, for its part had learnt the lesson of the post First World War period and decided to continue its involvement in the restoration of Europe. Wise Americans saw that there was not only the political instability which would result from hunger and economic ruin, but also the rise of an aggressive Soviet communism.

The relationship forged across the Atlantic by the shared need to defend democracy against fascism, now became an Alliance united once more in the face of a different threat. We tend to speak now of the Cold War, as a long series of incidents, but we forget that it began with a series of potentially explosive events. The Berlin Blockade and the Korean War propelled the allies into a new manner of urgent co – operation.

Under Clement Attlee and Harry S Truman, the successors to Churchill and Roosevelt, the practice of co – operation and co – ordination developed during the period from 1941 – 1945 by their various military, diplomatic and governmental agencies was continued. It was based on a shared need, and on shared values. This new Alliance became formalized into the Atlantic Alliance of 1949 which gave birth to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the most successful and enduring Alliance in history.

With the advent of NATO America committed itself to the permanent stationing of its forces in Europe. The military stability which this brought to the continent of Europe meant that for the first time in its history, former rivals were bound together in such a way as to make war between them unthinkable. Something we tend to forget. But more importantly, it bound the western European democracies together against the threat from across what my Grandfather accurately described as the Iron Curtain.

Attlee and Truman were both conscious of their inheritance. As they sought to re – build the world they had been handed by fate, they were guided by the same shared principles of democracy. But the unity of purpose forged in the darkest of days in very unpromising circumstances was renewed and reinvented to suit the changing times. This is an enduring testimony to the act of faith which gave birth to a very singular and profoundly important relationship.

Eden and Eisenhower

We all know that any relationship has its high points and its low points. Perhaps the events of the Suez debacle in 1956 are worthy of particular note. It shows that even close allies can see the same picture through different eyes, as happened between Eden and Eisenhower. This was a low point in the Trans – Atlantic relationship.

Britain, for its part, decided that it needed to re – build its relationship with America and under Macmillan’s wise statesmanship, matters were put back on an even keel.

Kennedy and Macmillan

Macmillan well understood the changing nature of events. He also understood the implications for Britain of the economic resurgence of Europe, resulting from the Marshall Aid programme and the security provided by the NATO Alliance, and thus the need for Britain to strengthen its ties with European neighbours.

Here again we see two different characters shaping the future of a relationship. Kennedy was old enough to have served in the Second World War, but, in his inaugural speech, he spoke of ‘the torch being passed to a new generation … tempered by a hard and bitter peace’. From his own experience, he understood how the world had been shaped and of the need to face down communism. Macmillan – the last Edwardian as he has often been described, and Kennedy formed an unlikely pair, but they wholly understood each other and where their countries were going.

The world had indeed become an increasingly dangerous place. The Cuban missile crisis underlined this point, if anybody had been in doubt. The creation of the Berlin Wall seemed to signify the potential for a European flash – point to have global consequences. In this fevered atmosphere Macmillan was able to achieve the Nassau Agreement with President Kennedy, resulting in the sharing of nuclear expertise: a treaty of the first importance which survives today.

Wilson and LBJ

Once again, America was robbed of a great statesman at the height of his powers, and a change of regime in Whitehall meant that another unlikely pair was charged with the responsibility of carrying forward the relationship. Both Johnson and Wilson were however severely pre – occupied with differing international and economic problems, from Vietnam to, in Wilson’s case, withdrawal from east of Suez.

The Six – Day war of 1967 served to remind everybody of Macmillan’s famous remarks that of all the perils besetting politicians, “events” were often the most troublesome. It also reminded politicians that the advent of the Cold – War had not made more conventional wars obsolete.

Heath and Nixon

Again, with Heath and Nixon, each was pre – occupied with differing priorities. In particular Edward Heath was determined to achieve Britain’s entry into the European Economic Community (EEC). Both countries were pursuing different foreign policy objectives.

Wilson / Callaghan and Ford / Carter

Both the Wilson – Callaghan and Ford / Carter periods were dominated by turmoil in the Middle – East, which hit western economies very hard in the mid 1970s. As a result alongside military alliances such as NATO and increasing economic co – operation in bodies like the EEC and G7, a new wave of active multilateralism was being created.

During the 1970s Britain’s economic position seemed to be irrevocably on the decline. In this regard the nature of the Trans – Atlantic relationship seemed to be more of an act of kindness by a beneficent America to an old friend fallen on hard times.

Thatcher and Reagan

To many students of the Anglo – American relationship the Thatcher Reagan era was the re – kindling of the substance of the Trans – Atlantic relationship. Their ideological beliefs were similar. Both had an intuitive gift that is given rarely to statesmen: to see beyond the squares of the chess board and sense the shifting tenor of their times.

Reagan instinctively knew that Soviet Communism was an empty vessel. He knew that the only reason the regime remained in place, in the face of increasing dissent, was by repression. He sensed that there was an opportunity to face down the Soviets through the technological lead that America had developed during the 1970s. He knew that America needed to be economically strong enough to undertake this task – and this required hard decisions. But he was right.

Margaret Thatcher held to similar beliefs: She also knew that the Soviet regime was changing: Incidentally, it was the Red Army’s paper “Red Star” which christened her “The Iron Lady”. She also knew that the Soviet regime was changing. She sensed that Gorbachev was a new kind of leader and when she pronounced that Gorbachev was “someone with whom we can do business”, she knew that the White House would be listening. But it was the unexpected developments in the Falkland Islands, twenty five years ago, on the 2nd of April, that propelled her into a different league of statesman.

To many in America the Falklands crisis initially seemed like another of those obscure post –colonial boundary disputes. Diplomacy in the United Nations seemed to be settling in for a long haul. But the dispatch of a naval task force signaled that Britain meant business. The response from the White House was nuanced. This was a dispute in America’s back yard and needed to be managed carefully. Never the less, this was a dispute about self government and freedom versus a military dictatorship, which for Ronald Reagan and Casper Weinberger struck a familiar echo.

America’s magnificent assistance to the British task force mirrored that of an earlier era. Military hardware was made available to Royal Navy aircraft enabling them to destroy Argentine fighters attacking the task force. Vital satellite imagery was made constantly available. And American facilities and other equipment were put at the disposal of British forces. The outcome of this conflict was a remarkable military triumph, for which we will always be grateful for America’s help.

The value of the closeness of the Thatcher – Reagan relationship was also shown by the issue of the deployment of land based cruise missiles in the UK to counter the Warsaw Pact’s short range SS – 20 missile.

The Soviet gamble failed. Negotiation was backed by resolution. Gorbachev realized that matters had to change. The end of the Warsaw Pact could not have happened without the vision of Ronald Reagan and the unswerving support of Margaret Thatcher.

Thatcher and Bush 41

George Bush Senior had been witness to these events as Vice – President and was thus equipped to carry forward the building of a new relationship with the post – communist Russian regime. As in the 1940s, the end of one period of strife presaged the onset of a new threat. There was no time to draw breath and congratulate themselves. Margaret Thatcher’s last act of statesmanship was to steady George Bush’s nerve on the news that Iraq had invaded Kuwait.

America and Britain went to war again, as part of a great coalition to liberate Kuwait and to defend the New World Order. In doing so, they took their eye off Iraq, with appalling attendant consequences.

Major and Clinton

Both John Major and Bill Clinton represented a generational change. Both were products of post – war peace and prosperity. They were a long way from the thinking of the 1940s, and their particular relationship was complicated, yet ultimately fruitful. On Bosnia and Northern Ireland they achieved a substantial measure of co – operation to important advantage.

Blair and Clinton

The relationship is then inherited by Tony Blair and Bill Clinton, who were clearly soul mates. They represented a new kind of left of centre politics. The so – called “Third Way”. Quite apart from the policy development they did together, they pushed forward the Northern Ireland peace process as well as working on the Kosovo problem.

Blair and Bush 43

But the great depth of the Trans – Atlantic relationship is exemplified by the relationship between Prime Minister Blair and President Bush 43. Yet again called upon to respond to unforeseen circumstances with their own political instincts of what they and their countrymen stood for. The attacks of the 11th of September were an assault upon an open society by those who feared what it represented. Yet the apparent weakness of this society, which the terrorists sought to exploit, has proven to be strength. An open society has nothing to fear except fear itself – as Roosevelt said.

But what September 11th ultimately showed is that the underlying conflict that our nations have to deal with is still between democracy and tyranny. Nazism was replaced by Communism. Hitler was replaced by Stalin. The Blitzkrieg was replaced by the nuclear stalemate of the Cold War. Al – Qaeda is as much a tyranny as the Nazis ever were – they do not proclaim freedom, they glorify in death.

Looking forward

The future of the Trans – Atlantic Relationship is dependent on those who come after the current generation of political leaders and the events that will shape them. It also depends on the value ascribed to this relationship by each party. Europe has again found its freedom, thanks in large part to the security and prosperity it enjoyed after 1945, and after the fall of the Berlin Wall. These are the fruits of the Marshall Plan, the Atlantic Alliance and of America’s commitment to Europe’s stability.

Britain has sought to play a role as a mediator between the New World and the Old. Sometimes it has done this successfully, as in the era of Reagan and Thatcher, sometimes less so. America has always renewed its political culture with every generation, yet it tries to hold true to its founding fathers idea of what kind of society it should be. However much we may argue back and forth across the Atlantic about Afghanistan, Iraq or the best way to deal with Iran, the democratic nations need to remain constant in their vigilance of their values. We should remember those who struggled to give us the privileges we enjoy today.

Whatever our particular political views we can all agree on the merits of democracy. The experience of those European countries that emerged from Communist rule in 1989 is telling. The lives of ordinary people were hemmed about by the daily pettiness of a tyranny which invaded every aspect of their lives. Whatever else we teach our children, we should teach them to treasure their values. We should also remind them of their history and its meaning in their lives. This will equip them to face the new challenges of tomorrow. As Churchill said: “Let us not start a quarrel between the present and the past – or we risk losing the future.”